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Abstract
We prove new results on common cause closedness of quantum probability spaces, where by
a quantum probability space is meant the projection lattice of a non-commutative von Neumann
algebra together with a countably additive probability measure on the lattice. Common cause
closedness is the feature that for every correlation between a pair of commuting projections there
exists in the lattice a third projection commuting with both of the correlated projections and
which is a Reichenbachian common cause of the correlation. The main result we prove is that
a quantum probability space is common cause closed if and only if it has at most one measure
theoretic atom. This result improves earlier ones published in [6]. The result is discussed
from the perspective of status of the Common Cause Principle. Open problems on common
cause closedness of general probability spaces (L, φ) are formulated, where L is an orthomodular
bounded lattice and φ is a probability measure on L.
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1 The main result
In this paper we prove new results on common cause closedness of quantum probability spaces.
By a quantum probability space is meant here the projection lattice of a non-commutative
∗Submitted for publication
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von Neumann algebra together with a countably additive probability measure on the lattice.
Common cause closedness is the feature that for every correlation between a pair of commuting
projections there exists in the lattice a third projection commuting with both of the correlated
projections and which is a Reichenbachian common cause of the correlation.
The main result we prove is that a quantum probability space is common cause closed if and
only if it has at most one measure theoretic atom. Since classical, Kolmogorovian probability
spaces were proved in [5] to be common cause closed if and only if they contained at most one
measure theoretic atom, and since classical probability spaces also can be regarded as projection
lattices of commutative von Neumann algebras, this result gives a complete characterization
of common cause closedness of probability spaces in the category of von Neumann algebras.
Previous results on common cause closedness of quantum probability spaces had to assume
an additional, somewhat artificial and not very transparent feature of the quantum probability
measure under which the quantum probability space could be proved to be common cause closed
[6]. With the removal of that condition it becomes visible that exactly the same type of measure
theoretical structure is responsible for the common cause closedness (or lack of it) of classical
and quantum probability spaces.
The broader context in which we give our proofs is the problem of characterization of com-
mon cause closedness of general probability spaces (L, φ), where L is an orthocomplemented,
orthomodular, bounded σ-lattice and φ is a countably additive general probability measure on L.
(Classical and quantum probability spaces are obviously special examples of abstract probability
spaces.) Little is known about the problem of common cause closedness in this generality how-
ever. A sufficient condition for common cause closedness of general probability theories is known
(Proposition 3.10 in [6], recalled here as Proposition 5) but the condition is exactly the not very
natural one that could be eliminated both in classical and in quantum probability spaces, and
one would like to know whether it also can be eliminated (or replaced by a more natural one)
in general probability theories (Problem 15). It also is unknown whether the condition which
is necessary for common cause closedness of quantum probability spaces is necessary for the
common cause closedness of general probability theories as well (Problem 16). Further open
questions and possible directions of investigation will be indicated in section 7.
The conceptual-philosophical significance of common cause closed probability spaces is that
they display a particular form of causal completeness: these theories themselves can explain,
exclusively in terms of common causes that they contain, all the correlations they predict; hence
these theories comply in an extreme manner with the Common Cause Principle. Probabilistic
physical theories in which the probability space is measure theoretically purely non-atomic are
therefore good candidates for being a confirming evidence for the Common Cause Principle.
Section 6 discusses this foundational-philosophical significance of the presented results in the
context of the more general problem of assessing the status of the Common Cause Principle.
Further sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 fixes some notation and
recalls some basic definitions in lattice theory. In section 3 the notion of common cause in a
general probability theories is defined. In Section 4 it is shown that for a probability space, clas-
sical or quantum, to be common cause closed it is sufficient that they have at most one measure
theoretic atom (Propositions 7 and 9). Section 5 proves that this condition is also necessary,
both in case of classical probability spaces (Proposition 12) and in quantum probability spaces
(Proposition 14). Section 7 formulates some problems that are open at this time.
2 General probability spaces - definitions and nota-
tions
Throughout the paper L denotes an orthocomplemented lattice with lattice operations ∨,∧ and
orthocomplementation ⊥. The lattice L is called orthomodular if, for any A,B ∈ L such that
A ≤ B, we have
B = A ∨ (B ∧A⊥) (1)
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The lattice L is called a Boolean algebra if it is distributive, i.e. if for any A,B,C ∈ L we have
A ∨ (B ∧ C) = (A ∨B) ∧ (A ∨ C) (2)
It is clear that a Boolean algebra is an orthomodular lattice. Other examples of orthomodular
lattices are the lattices of projections of a von Neumann algebra; they are called von Neumann
lattices. The projection lattice of a von Neumann algebra is distributive if and only if the von
Neumann algebra is commutative. A basic reference for orthocomplemented lattices is [16]. For
a summary of basic facts about von Neumann algebras and von Neumann lattices we refer to
[21], for the theory of von Neumann algebra our reference is [15]. The paper [25] gives a concise
review of the basics of quantum probability theory.
If, for every subset S of L, the join and the meet of all elements in S exist, then L is called a
complete orthomodular lattice. If the join and meet of all elements of every countable subset S of
L exist in L, then L is called a σ-lattice. Von Neumann lattices are complete hence σ-complete.
In the present paper, it is assumed that lattices are bounded: they have a smallest and a largest
element denoted by 0 and I , respectively.
Let L be a σ-complete orthomodular lattice. Elements A and B are called mutually orthog-
onal if A ≤ B⊥. The map φ : L → [0, 1] is called a (general) probability measure if φ(I) = 1 and
φ(A ∨ B) = φ(A) + φ(B) for any mutual orthogonal elements A and B. A probability measure
φ is called a σ-additive probability measure if for any countable, mutually orthogonal elements
{Ai|i ∈ N}, we have
φ(∨i∈NAi) =
∑
i∈N
φ(Ai) (3)
Next we consider atoms. There are two types of atoms: algebraic and measure theoretic.
An element A ∈ L is called an algebraic atom if A > 0 and, for any B ≤ A we have B = A or
B = 0. The other type of atom depends on a probability measure on L. Let φ be a probability
measure on L. An element A ∈ L is called a φ-atom if φ(A) > 0 and, for any B ≤ A we have
φ(B) = φ(A) or φ(B) = 0.
A probability measure φ on L is called
• purely atomic if for any A ∈ L with φ(A) > 0 there exists a φ-atom B ∈ L such that
B ≤ A,
• purely nonatomic if for any A ∈ L with φ(A) > 0 there exists an element B ∈ L such that
B < A and 0 < φ(B) < φ(A).
If φ(A) = 0 implies A = 0 for any A ∈ L, then φ is called faithful. Roughly speaking,
this condition means that the elements whose probabilities are zero are ignored because such
elements are identified with the zero element. According to the following Lemma, we can identify
a φ-atom with an atom in the case where φ is faithful. Since we will deal with faithful measures
in the paper, algebraic and measure theoretic atoms can be identified and this will be done
implicitly in this paper.
Lemma 1. Let φ be a faithful probability measure on L. A is a φ-atom if and only if A is an
atom.
Proof. Let A be a φ-atom. For any B such that B ≤ A, φ(B) = φ(A) or φ(B) = 0. φ(B) = 0
implies B = 0 because φ is faithful. φ(B) = φ(A) implies φ(A⊥ ∧ B) = 0, so that A =
B ∨ (A⊥ ∧ B) = B. This means that A is an atom. It is trivial that A is a φ-atom if A is an
atom. 
We say that two elements A and B in an orthomodular lattice L are compatible if
A = (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧B⊥) (4)
It can be shown [16][Theorem 3.2] that (4) holds if and only if
B = (B ∧ A) ∨ (B ∧A⊥) (5)
In other words, the compatibility relation is symmetric. If L is a Boolean algebra, any two
elements in L are compatible.
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3 Definition of common cause closedness
In order to investigate common cause closedness in an orthomodular lattice, we must re-define
both the concept of correlation and the notion of common cause of the correlation with which
we define common cause closedness. The reason why these concepts have to be re-defined ex-
plicitly is that Reichenbach’s original definition was given in terms of classical probability spaces
[27][Section 19], and in such probability spaces all random events are compatible. In the lattice
L of a general probability space there exist elements however which are not compatible. Hence
it must be stipulated explicitly whether we allow (i) incompatible elements to be correlated and
(ii) the common causes of correlations to be incompatible with the elements in the correlation.
We take a conservative route by disallowing such cases:
Let A and B be compatible elements in L. We say that A and B are (positively) correlated
in state φ on L if
φ(A ∧ B) > φ(A)φ(B) (6)
Definition 2 ([11] Definition 6.1). Let L be an orthomodular lattice, let φ be a probability
measure on L and let A and B be elements of L. C ∈ L is called a common cause of the
correlation (6) if C is compatible with both A and B, 0 < φ(C) < 1 and C satisfies the following
equations:
φ(A ∧B ∧ C)
φ(C)
=
φ(A ∧ C)
φ(C)
φ(B ∧ C)
φ(C)
(7)
φ(A ∧ B ∧ C⊥)
φ(C⊥)
=
φ(A ∧ C⊥)
φ(C⊥)
φ(B ∧ C⊥)
φ(C⊥)
(8)
φ(A ∧ C)
φ(C)
>
φ(A ∧ C⊥)
φ(C⊥)
(9)
φ(B ∧ C)
φ(C)
>
φ(B ∧ C⊥)
φ(C⊥)
(10)
If C is a common cause of the correlation between A and B, and differs from both A and B,
then we call the element C a nontrivial common cause.
This definition is the complete analogue of Reichenbach’s: it coincides with Reichenbach’s
original definition when one views it in the classical probability space consisting of the distribu-
tive sublattice of L generated by the elements A,B and C with the restriction of φ to this
Boolean algebra.
We can now give the central definition of the paper:
Definition 3. Let L be an orthomodular lattice and let φ be a probability measure on L. We
say that (L, φ) is common cause closed if, for any distinct, compatible elements A and B such
that φ(A ∧B) > φ(A)φ(B), there is a nontrivial common cause C in L of the correlation.
Note that one can argue for a more liberal definition of common cause in which the common
cause is not required to be compatible with the correlating events. Common cause closedness
can be investigated under such a definition of common cause as well but we do not wish to
pursue this direction in this paper, see the papers [8], [9], [12] and [11][Chapter 8] for the notion
of non-commutative common cause and some of its features.
4 A sufficient condition for common cause closedness
Gyenis and Re´dei [5] gave a characterization of common cause closedness of classical probability
measure spaces. In the proof of that characterization the following result of Johnson [14] played
an important role. Let (S , p) be a classical probability measure space. Johnson [14] showed that
the probability measure p can be decomposed into probability measures p1 and p2,
p = αp1 + (1− α)p2 (11)
4
for some α ∈ [0, 1], where p1 is purely atomic and p2 is purely nonatomic.
A similar decomposition is not known to hold in a general probability space. Thus, in order to
prove a sufficient condition for common cause closedness of general probability theories, Gyenis
and Re´dei [6] introduced the notion of Q-decomposability: It is a special case of a decomposition
of a probability measure.
Definition 4 ([6] p. 445). A σ-additive probability measure φ on a σ-complete orthomodular
lattice L is said to be Q-decomposable, where Q is an element of L, if there exists a decomposition
φ = αφ1+(1−α)φ2, with α ∈ [0, 1], furthermore φ2 is a purely nonatomic, σ-additive probability
measure, and for φ1 we have:
φ1(A) =
{
1 (if Q ≤ A)
0 (otherwise).
(12)
Making use of Q-decomposability, Gyenis and Re´dei [6] strengthened Proposition 3.9 in [17]
in the following way:
Proposition 5 ([6] Proposition 3.10). Let L be a σ-complete orthomodular lattice and let φ be
a faithful σ-additive probability measure on L. If there is at most one φ-atom Q in L, and φ is
Q-decomposable, then (L, φ) is common cause closed.
Q-decomposability is a somewhat artificial and non-transparent condition however. Therefore
it is desirable to investigate whether one can remove or replace it by another, more natural
condition. It is not known if this can be done in general probability theories. We claim however
that it can be both in classical and in quantum probability theories. First we examine the
classical case. We prove the following lemma to remove the condition of Q-decomposability in
Proposition 5.
Lemma 6. Let L be a σ-complete Boolean algebra and let φ be a faithful σ-additive probability
measure on L. If L has at most one φ-atom Q, then φ is Q-decomposable.
Proof. If there is no φ-atom in L, then φ is purely nonatomic. Thus φ is Q-decomposable.
Suppose that L has one single φ-atom Q. For any A ∈ L, let the maps φ′1 and φ
′
2 be defined
by
φ′1(A) := φ(A ∧Q) (13)
φ′2(A) := φ(A ∧ (A ∧Q)
⊥) (14)
Then φ = φ′1 + φ
′
2 since A = (A ∧Q) ∨ (A ∧ (A ∧Q)
⊥). If φ′1(I) = 1, then Q = I . In this case,
φ is Q-decomposable. We, thus, assume that φ′1(I) < 1. Then φ
′
2(I) > 0. Define φ1 and φ2 as
follows:
φ1 := (1/φ
′
1(I))φ
′
1 (15)
φ2 := (1/φ
′
2(I))φ
′
2 (16)
and let α := φ′1(I). Then φ = αφ1 + (1− α)φ2 and φ1(I) = φ2(I) = 1.
For any A such that Q ≤ A, we have φ1(A) = 1. For any A such that Q 6≤ A, A ∧ Q = 0
since A ∧Q < Q and Q is an atom. Thus φ1(A) = 0 for any A such that Q 6≤ A.
Next we show that φ1 and φ2 are σ-additive probability measures.
Let {Ai|i ∈ N} be a countable set of mutually orthogonal elements in L. We distinguish two
cases:
(i) Suppose that Ai ∧Q = 0 for any i ∈ N.
Because L is a Boolean algebra, for any i ∈ N we have.
Q = (Ai ∧Q) ∨ (A
⊥
i ∧Q) = A
⊥
i ∧Q (17)
This implies Ai ≤ Q
⊥ for any i ∈ N. Thus, ∨i∈NAi ≤ Q
⊥. Therefore
(∨i∈NAi) ∧Q = 0 (18)
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Hence
φ1(∨i∈NAi) =
∑
i∈N
φ1(Ai) = 0 (19)
and
φ2(∨i∈NAi) = (1/(1− α))(φ(∨i∈NAi)− αφ1(∨i∈NAi)) (20)
= (1/(1− α))φ(∨i∈NAi) (21)
= (1/(1− α))
∑
i∈N
φ(Ai) (22)
=
∑
i∈N
((1/(1− α))φ(Ai)− αφ1(Ai)) (23)
=
∑
i∈N
φ2(Ai) (24)
(ii) Suppose that there is Aj such that Aj ∧Q 6= 0.
Since 0 < Aj ∧Q ≤ Q and Q is a φ-atom, we have Q = Aj ∧Q. Therefore
φ1(Aj) = φ(Aj ∧Q)/φ(Q) = 1 (25)
and
1 ≤ φ1(Aj) = φ(Aj ∧Q)/φ(Q) ≤ φ((∨i∈NAi) ∧Q)/φ(Q) (26)
= φ1(∨i∈NAi) ≤ 1 (27)
Moreover, A⊥i ≥ Aj ≥ Q for any i ∈ N such that i 6= j, so that Ai∧Q = 0. Thus φ1(Ai) = 0
for any i ∈ N such that i 6= j. Hence
φ1(∨i∈NAi) =
∑
i∈N
φ1(Ai) = 1 (28)
and
φ2(∨i∈NAi) = (1/(1− α))(φ(∨i∈NAi)− αφ1(∨i∈NAi)) (29)
= (1/(1− α))(φ(∨i∈NAi)− α) (30)
= (1/(1− α))(φ(Aj)− α) + (1/(1− α))
∑
i6=j
φ(Ai) (31)
= (1/(1− α))(φ(Aj)− αφ1(Aj)) + (1/(1− α)) (32)
×
∑
i6=j
(φ(Ai)− αφ1(Ai)) (33)
= φ2(Aj) +
∑
i6=j
φ2(Ai) (34)
=
∑
i∈N
φ2(Ai) (35)
Finally we show that φ2 is purely nonatomic. Let A be an element in L such that φ2(A) > 0.
Then A ∧ (A ∧Q)⊥ > 0 since φ is faithful. Suppose that Q ≤ A ∧ (A ∧Q)⊥. Then Q ≤ A and
Q ≤ (A∧Q)⊥, which implies Q = A∧Q ≤ Q⊥. This is a contradiction. Thus Q 6≤ A∧(A∧Q)⊥;
that is we have
Q ∧ (A ∧ (A ∧Q)⊥) = 0 (36)
Because Q is the only φ-atom by assumption, A ∧ (A ∧ Q)⊥ is not a φ-atom. So there is an
element X ∈ L such that
0 < X < A ∧ (A ∧Q)⊥ (37)
By Equation (36) we have X ∧Q = 0. Thus
X = X ∧ (X ∧Q)⊥ (38)
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Hence
0 < φ(X) = φ(X ∧ (X ∧Q)⊥) = φ′2(X) (39)
and
φ′2(X) = φ(X) < φ(A ∧ (A ∧Q)
⊥) = φ′2(A) (40)
This shows that φ2 is purely nonatomic. 
By Proposition 5 and Lemma 6, we get the following proposition as a corollary.
Proposition 7. Let L be a σ-complete Boolean algebra and let φ be a faithful σ-additive proba-
bility measure on L. If L has at most one φ-atom, then (L, φ) is common cause closed.
Next we consider the case of quantum probability spaces. We proceed along the logic fol-
lowed in the classical case: we prove a lemma that is analogous to Lemma 6 showing that
Q-decomposability is entailed by the feature that Q is the only measure theoretic atom:
Lemma 8. Let L be the orthomodular lattice of projections of a von Neumann algebra N, and
let φ be a faithful normal state on N. If L has at most one φ-atom Q, then φ is Q-decomposable.
Proof. Let N be a von Neumann algebra, and let C(N) be the center of N. There are projections
PI , Pn ∈ C(N) such that PI +Pn = I , NPI is of type I and NPn is not of type I (Theorem 6.5.2
in [15]).
If there is no φ-atom in L, then PI = 0. In this case, φ is purely nonatomic. Thus, φ is
Q-decomposable. If PI = I , then PI = Q. Thus φ is Q-decomposable.
Suppose that 0 < PI < I . Define φ1 and φ2 by
φ1(A) := φ(API)/φ(PI) (41)
φ2(A) := φ(APn)/φ(Pn) (42)
and let α := φ(PI). Then φ = αφ1 + (1− α)φ2.
Suppose that NPI contains two projections. Then it contains two φ-atoms because NPI is
of type I. This is a contradiction. Thus, NPI contains only one projection. Therefore, PI = Q.
For any projection A ∈ N such that Q ≤ A, we have
φ1(A) = φ(API)/φ(PI) = φ(AQ)/φ(Q) = 1 (43)
For any projection A ∈ N such that Q 6≤ A, A is in NPn, that is, A ≤ Pn. Thus, φ1(A) =
φ(API)/φ(PI) = 0. NPn does not have any φ-atom, φ2 is purely nonatomic. 
By Proposition 5 and Lemma 8, we get the following proposition as a corollary.
Proposition 9. Let L be an orthomodular lattice of projections of a von Neumann algebra N
and let φ be a faithful σ-additive probability measure on L. If L has at most one φ-atom, then
(L, φ) is common cause closed.
Propositions 7 and 9 mean that the condition that L has at most one φ-atom is a sufficient
condition for common cause closedness in the category of von Neumann algebras.
5 A necessary condition for common cause closedness
Next we consider the necessary condition for common cause closedness. Gyenis and Re´dei [6]
showed that an orthomodular lattice which has two distinct φ-atoms is not common cause closed
under an additional condition:
Proposition 10 ([6] Proposition 3.8). Let L be a σ-complete orthomodular lattice and let φ be
a faithful σ-additive probability measure on L. If L contains two distinct φ-atoms P and Q such
that φ(P ∨Q) < 1, then (L, φ) is not common cause closed.
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We show that if (L, φ) is either a classical or a quantum probability space, the assumption of
condition φ(P ∨Q) < 1 in Proposition 10 can be replaced by the condition that there is a pair
of correlated elements in L. This latter condition is more natural to assume because the aim of
the Reichenbachian common cause is to explain correlations.
First we examine the case of a classical probability space.
Lemma 11. Let L be a Boolean algebra and let φ be a faithful probability measure on L. Assume
that L contains two atoms P and Q (recall that atoms are also φ-atoms by faithfulness of φ).
There are two distinct elements A and B in L such that φ(A ∧ B) > φ(A)φ(B) if and only if
φ(P ∨Q) < 1.
Proof. First we prove that if A and B are elements in L such that φ(A∧B) > φ(A)φ(B) and P
and Q are distinct φ-atoms, then φ(P∨Q) < 1. The proof is indirect: Suppose that φ(P∨Q) = 1.
We show that this leads to contradiction.
Define φ1 and φ2 by
φ1(X) := φ((X ∧ P ) ∨ (X ∧Q)) (44)
φ2(X) := φ(X ∧ {(X ∧ P ) ∨ (X ∧Q)}
⊥) (45)
for any X ∈ L. Then φ = φ1 + φ2 since
X = {(X ∧ P ) ∨ (X ∧Q)} ∨ (X ∧ {(X ∧ P ) ∨ (X ∧Q)}⊥)) (46)
For any X ∈ L we have
φ1(X ∨X
⊥) = φ((X ∨X⊥) ∧ P ) ∨ ((X ∨X⊥) ∧Q))
= φ((X ∧ P ) ∨ (X⊥ ∧ P ) ∨ (X ∧Q) ∨ (X⊥ ∧Q))
= φ((X ∧ P ) ∨ (X ∧Q)) + φ((X⊥ ∧ P ) ∨ (X⊥ ∧Q))
= φ1(X) + φ1(X
⊥)
Thus for any X ∈ L we have:
φ2(I) = φ2(X ∨X
⊥) (47)
= φ(X ∨X⊥)− φ1(X ∨X
⊥) (48)
= φ(X)− φ1(X) + φ(X
⊥)− φ1(X
⊥) (49)
= φ2(X) + φ2(X
⊥) (50)
≥ φ2(X) (51)
Since φ(P ∨ Q) = 1 by our indirect assumption, using the decomposition of φ into φ1 and φ2,
and keeping in mind the definition of φ1 we have
φ2(I) = φ(I)− φ1(I) (52)
= 1− φ(P ∨Q) = 0 (53)
This, by equations (47)-(51), entails φ2(X) = 0 for any X ∈ L. It follows that
φ(X) = φ1(X) = φ((X ∧ P ) ∨ (X ∧Q)) (54)
Since P and Q are distinct atoms, one also has:
P = P ∧ (Q ∨Q⊥) (55)
= (P ∧Q) ∨ (P ∧Q⊥) (56)
= P ∧Q⊥ (57)
≤ Q⊥ (58)
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It follows that X ∧ P is orthogonal to X ∧Q. Thus for all X ∈ L
φ(X) = φ(X ∧ P ) + φ(X ∧Q) (59)
Since φ(A ∧ B) > φ(A)φ(B), we have φ(A) > 0 and φ(B) > 0. Inserting X = A and X = B
into equation (59), we see that we have the following cases:
(i) φ(A ∧ P ) > 0 or φ(A ∧Q) > 0
and
(ii) φ(B ∧ P ) > 0 or φ(B ∧Q) > 0
Suppose that φ(A ∧ P ) > 0 and φ(B ∧Q) > 0. (The other combinations of the possibilities
in (i) and (ii) can be handled exactly the same way.) Then 0 < A ∧ P ≤ P and 0 < B ∧Q ≤ Q.
Since P and Q are atoms, A ∧ P = P and B ∧ Q = Q, which entails P ≤ A and Q ≤ B. We
now separate the cases according to how P and A and Q and B are related:
• if P = A and Q = B, then A∧B = P ∧Q = 0 because P and Q are distinct atoms. Hence
0 = φ(A ∧ B) < φ(A)φ(B). This is a contradiction because A and B were assumed to be
positively correlated in φ.
• If P < A and Q = B, then P⊥ ∧ A > 0 since A = P ∨ (P⊥ ∧ A). Since φ is faithful, we
have then φ(P⊥ ∧ A) > 0. Inserting X = P⊥ ∧A into quation (59) we obtain
0 < φ(P⊥ ∧ A) = φ((P⊥ ∧A) ∧ P ) + φ((P⊥ ∧ A) ∧Q) (60)
which entails φ(A ∧ P⊥ ∧Q) > 0. Thus
0 < A ∧ P⊥ ∧Q ≤ Q (61)
Since Q is an atom, equation (61) entails
A ∧ P⊥ ∧Q = Q (62)
from which A ∧ P⊥ ≥ Q follows. Thus Q ≤ A. The inequalities P ≤ A and Q ≤ A entail
P ∨Q ≤ A, thus 1 = φ(P ∨Q) ≤ φ(A). Hence φ(A∧B) ≤ φ(A)φ(B). This contradicts the
indirect assumption that A and B are positively correlated in φ.
• If P < A and Q < B, a contradiction follows in a similar way; we leave out the details.
Therefore φ(P ∨Q) < 1.
We now show that if P and Q are distinct φ-atoms in L such that φ(P ∨Q) < 1, then there
are elements A and B in L such that φ(A∧B) > φ(A)φ(B). Let A := P ∨Q and B := P . Then
φ(A ∧B) = φ((P ∨Q) ∧ P ) (63)
= φ(P ) (64)
> φ(P ∨Q)φ(P ) (65)
= φ(A)φ(B) (66)

By Propositions 7 and 10 and Lemma 11, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 12 (cf. [5] Theorem 1). Let L be a σ-complete Boolean algebra, let φ be a faithful
σ-additive probability measure on L and let L contain two distinct elements A and B such that
φ(A ∧B) > φ(A)φ(B). (L, φ) is common cause closed if and only if L has at most one φ-atom.
Next we consider quantum probability spaces. In this case, a result similar to Lemma 11
holds.
Lemma 13. Let L be the orthomodular lattice of projections of a von Neumann algebra N and let
φ be a faithful normal state of N. Assume L contains two atoms P and Q (which are φ-atoms as
well by Lemma 1). There are two distinct elements A and B in L such that φ(A∧B) > φ(A)φ(B)
if and only if φ(P ∨Q) < 1.
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Proof. We prove first that if the von Neumann lattice L has two distinct atoms P and Q and
two projections A and B such that φ(A ∧ B) > φ(A)φ(B), then φ(P ∨Q) < 1.
Let C(N) be the center of N. By Theorem 6.5.2 in [15] there are projections PI , Pn ∈ C(N)
such that
• PI + Pn = I
• NPI is of type I
• NPn is not of type I
We again separate the cases:
(a) Suppose that Pn > 0. If P and Q are distinct atoms, then φ(P ∨Q) < 1 since P,Q ≤ PI <
PI + Pn = I .
(b) Let Pn = 0. Then N is of type I.
Subcases:
(i) Suppose that N is of type I2.
Since φ(A ∧ B) > φ(A)φ(B), we have φ(A) > 0 and φ(B) > 0. Thus there are
atoms R1 and R2 such that R1 ≤ A and R2 ≤ B. If R1 = A and R2 = B, then
A ∧ B = R1 ∧ R2 = 0. Hence φ(A ∧ B) < φ(A)φ(B). This is a contradiction. If
R1 < A, then 0 < A∧R
⊥
1 . Thus there is an atom R3 such that R3 ≤ A∧R
⊥
1 . Since N
is of type I2, R1∨R3 = I , which implies I = R1∨R3 ≤ A. Hence φ(A∧B) ≤ φ(A)φ(B).
This is a contradiction. A contradiction follows similarly in the case where R2 < B.
Hence N is not of type I2.
(ii) Suppose N is of type I1.
Then there are two distinct atoms P and Q such that φ(P ∨ Q) < 1 by Lemma 11
because the von Neumann algebra N is abelian in this case.
(iii) Suppose N is of type In, where n ≥ 3.
Then there are three mutually orthogonal projections P , Q, and R. Thus φ(P∨Q) < 1.
The proof that if there are two atoms P and Q in von Neumann lattice L such that φ(P∨Q) <
1 then there are elements A,B in L that are positively correlated in φ is the same as the
corresponding proof in Lemma 11. 
By Propositions 9 and 10 and Lemma 13, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 14. Let L be an orthomodular lattice of projections of a von Neumann algebra N,
let φ be a faithful normal state of N and let N contain two distinct projections A and B such
that φ(A ∧ B) > φ(A)φ(B). (L, φ) is common cause closed if and only if L has at most one
φ-atom.
6 Common cause closedness and the Common Cause
Principle
The philosophical significance of common cause closedness of probability spaces is that they
display a particular form of causal completeness: these theories themselves can explain all the
correlations they predict, and the explanation is exclusively in terms of common causes they
contain. Hence these theories comply in an extreme manner with the Common Cause Principle.
Recall that the Common Cause Principle states that a correlation between events is either
due to a direct causal link between the correlated events, or there is a third event, a common
cause that explains the correlation. This principle, which goes back to Reichenbach [27], and
which was sharply articulated mainly by Salmon [28], [29], is a strong claim about the relation
of correlations and causality, and its status has been subject of intense analysis in philosophy of
science.
The initial phase of the investigations in works of Salmon and others such as van Fraassen
[3], Cartwright [2], Sober [30], [31], [32] was semi-formal: precise models of the phenomena the
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papers analyzed were typically not given in terms of explicitly specified probability measure
spaces. Thus the reasoning remained vague in crucial respects. The recent trend in investigating
the Common Cause Principle is different: The concepts and claims related to the principle get
a mathematically precise, sharp definition, they are analyzed mathematically and the results
are interpreted from the perspective of their metaphysical-philosophical ramification. Examples
of this approach are especially the works of the “Cracow school”, of the “Bern school” and of
the “Budapest school” (see the books [34], [11], [35], the references therein, and also the recent
papers by Sober and Steel [33], Marczyk and Wronski [18]), Grasshoff et al. [4], and Portmann
and Wu¨ethrich [20].
There have been two broad and important consequences of the more technical analysis of the
Common Cause Principle: One is the insight that assessing the status of the Common Cause
Principle is a much more complicated and subtle matter than previously thought. The other is
that the mathematical analysis has established direct contacts to those scientific theories that
have empirically confirmed claims which are directly relevant for the truth (or otherwise) of the
Common Cause Principle – first and foremost to non-relativistic quantum mechanics of finite
degrees of freedom and to relativistic quantum field theory.
The philosophical reason why assessing the status of the Common Cause Principle is dif-
ficult, is well known from the history of philosophy: the Common Cause Principle makes two
general existential claims, and we know that falsifying empirically a hypothesis making even one
existential claim is problematic because one cannot search the whole universe, past, present and
future to find a falsifying instance. This was most unambiguously stated by Popper [19]. In
short: Principles such as the Common Cause Principle are of metaphysical character. History of
philosophy, from Kant and Hume through Popper teaches us that metaphysical claims cannot
be verified or even falsified conclusively.
This general difficulty takes a very specific form in connection with the Common Cause
Principle: It is certainly not enough for a falsification of the Common Cause Principle to dis-
play a probabilistic theory that contains a correlation but no common cause for it because the
hypothetical common cause may be hidden: it may not be part of the theory predicting the
correlation, but it may very well be part of a larger, more comprehensive theory having a more
detailed picture of the world by using a richer Boolean algebra in its probabilistic part. We may
never find that larger theory but we know that its existence is logically possible: every classical
probability theory that is not common cause closed can be embedded into a larger one which
is; this is one of the conclusions of the formal analysis in [10], [5] (also see [11][Chapter 6] and
[18]). This feature of classical probability spaces is called common cause cause completability of
not common cause closed probability spaces.
Thus, rather than trying to verify or falsify the Common Cause Principle, one should settle
on a more modest goal: to look at our best, confirmed scientific theories to see whether they
offer evidence in favor or against the truth of the Common Cause Principle (for a more de-
tailed discussions of this point see [11][Chapter 10] and [22]). It is in connection with such an
evaluation of the Common Cause Principle that common cause closedness becomes relevant: If
a probabilistic theory is such that the probability theory it employs to describe phenomena is
common cause closed then that theory is a strong candidate for being a confirming evidence in
favor of the Common Cause Principle.
Crucial in this respect is (relativistic) quantum field theory, which, by its very construction,
is intended to comply fully with causality. Since quantum field theory, at least in its mathemat-
ically precise, “axiomatic” form [7], [1], is based on quantum probability theory, characterizing
common cause closedness of such quantum probability theories is relevant from the perspective
of evaluating the causal behavior of quantum field theory. The characterization in terms of the
measure theoretic atomicity given in this paper makes contact to a deep structural property
of quantum field theory: The atomicity structure of quantum probability theories is intimately
linked to the Murray-von Neumann classification of (factor) von Neumann algebras: Type II1
and type III factor von Neumann algebras with faithful states define purely non-atomic quan-
tum probability theories [25]. Furthermore, it is a fundamental feature of relativistic quantum
field theories formulated in terms of covariant local nets of von Neumann algebras that the al-
gebras representing strictly local observables are type III factors [7][Section V.6]. Thus these
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algebras typically define measure theoretically purely non-atomic quantum probability theories.
Consequently, relativistic quantum field theories are common cause closed and hence very good
candidates for being causally complete in the sense of being capable of explaining causally all
the correlations they predict.
Note the careful wording of the previous sentence: quantum field theory has not been proved
to be in full compliance with locality. This is because in this framework one can impose locality
conditions on the common cause, in addition to the defining conditions (7)-(10), and it is an
open problem whether the theory contains local common causes for all the correlations that are
in need of a common cause explanation [24], [26], [11][Chapter 8]. But if a quantum probability
theory is not common cause closed, then one cannot expect the theory to have common causes
of the correlations that would need to be explained this way. This happens in discrete (lattice)
quantum field theory of finite degrees of freedom. In these theories there exist correlations
between observables pertaining to spacelike separated local algebras for which there exist no
local common cause in the theory simply because these probability theories have many atoms
and thus they contain a lot of correlations for which there are no common causes at all in the
theory [13], [11][Chapter 8].
7 Some open questions
The results in sections 4 and 5 give a complete characterization of common cause closedness of
probability theories understood as projection lattices of both commutative and non-commutative
von Neumann algebras. Thus we have a characterization of common cause closedness of classical
and quantum probability theories. As the propositions show, the same structural property is
equivalent to common cause closedness in classical and quantum probability theories (not having
more than one measure theoretic atom). It remains open however whether this structural prop-
erty is equivalent to common cause closedness of general probability theories as well. Specifically,
three open problems can be formulated.
The first problem is related to a sufficient condition of common cause closedness of general
probability theories. We have seen that Q-decomposability plays an important role in common
cause closedness. Lemma 6 and Lemma 8 aboutQ-decomposability lead to the following problem:
Problem 15. Let L be a σ-complete orthomodular lattice and let φ be a faithful σ-additive
probability measure on L. Does the assumption that L has at most one φ-atom Q entail that φ
is Q-decomposable?
The second problem is related to a necessary condition for common cause closedness in a
general orthomodular lattice. We get a characterization of common cause closedness by using
Lemma 11 and Lemma 13. These lemmas lead to the following problem:
Problem 16. Let L be a σ-complete orthomodular lattice which has two distinct atoms and let
φ be a faithful σ-additive probability measure on L. Are the following two conditions equivalent?
1. There are two distinct elements A and B in L such that φ(A ∧B) > φ(A)φ(B).
2. There are two distinct φ-atoms P and Q such that φ(P ∨Q) < 1.
If these conditions are not equivalent, is there a natural condition which is equivalent to Condition
2?
The third problem is related to common cause completability. As mentioned in section
6, common cause completability makes falsification of the Common Cause Principle difficult
because it allows evading falsification by referring to hidden common causes. Not common cause
closed classical probability spaces are common cause completable [5] (also see [11][Chapter 6]
and [18]). By the characterization of common cause closedness (Theorem 14), we can specify
the quantum probability measure spaces which are not common cause closed. For example, the
orthomodular lattice of all projections on a Hilbert space (Hilbert lattices) are not common
cause closed because these probability theories contain a lot of measure theoretic atoms. Then
the following question arises; is there a larger probability measure space into which these non-
common cause closed quantum probability spaces are embeddable? The answer to this question
is unknown. More generally we have
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Problem 17. Can a general probability space (L, φ) be embedded into a larger one (L′, φ′) which
has at most one φ-atom?
By an embedding is meant here an injective ortholattice homomorphism h : L → L′ which
preserves φ in the sense φ′(h(A)) = φ(A) for all A ∈ L.
Recently the notion of common cause has been given a general definition in terms of non-
selective operations understood as completely positive, unit preserving linear maps on C∗-
algebras [23]. That definition makes it possible to formulate common cause closedness of quan-
tum field theories on possibly non-flat spacetimes in the categorial approach to relativistic quan-
tum field theory. It would be interesting to find out what role the structural properties of the
operator algebras play in common cause closedness (or lack of it) in such theories. Nothing is
known about this question, so we omit the precise definitions.
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